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Abstract
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that
coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret
learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main tech-
nical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a.,
Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows directly
from the smoothness-based proof of near-optimal welfare in the same game when
the private information is public. Second, no-regret learning dynamics converge
to Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium in these incomplete information games.
These results are enabled by interpretation of a Bayesian game as a stochastic
game of complete information.
1 Introduction
A recent confluence of results from game theory and learning theory gives a simple explanation for
why good outcomes in large families of strategically-complex games can be expected. The advance
comes from (a) a relaxation the classical notion of equilibrium in games to one that corresponds to
the outcome attained when players’ behavior ensures asymptotic no-regret, e.g., via standard online
learning algorithms such as weighted majority, and (b) an extension theorem that shows that the
standard approach for bounding the quality of classical equilibria automatically implies the same
bounds on the quality of no-regret equilibria. This paper generalizes these results from static games
to Bayesian games, for example, auctions.
Our motivation for considering learning outcomes in Bayesian games is the following. Many impor-
tant games model repeated interactions between an uncertain set of participants. Sponsored search,
and more generally, online ad-auction market places, are important examples of such games. Plat-
forms are running millions of auctions, with each individual auction slightly different and of only
very small value, but such market places have high enough volume to be the financial basis of large
industries. This online auction environment is best modeled by a repeated Bayesian game: the auc-
tion game is repeated over time, with the set of participants slightly different each time, depending
on many factors from budgets of the players to subtle differences in the opportunities.
A canonical example to which our methods apply is a single-item first-price auction with players’
values for the item drawn from a product distribution. In such an auction, players simultaneously
submit sealed bids and the player with the highest bid wins and pays her bid. The utility of the
winner is her value minus her bid; the utilities of the losers are zero. When the values are drawn from
non-identical continuous distributions the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is given by a differential equation
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that is not generally analytically tractable, cf. [8] (and generalizations of this model, computationally
hard, see [3]). Again, though their Bayes-Nash equilibria are complex, we show that good outcomes
can be expected in these kinds of auctions.
Our approach to proving that good equilibria can be expected in repeated Bayesian games is to
extend an analogous result for static games,1 i.e., the setting where the same game with the same
payoffs and the same players is repeated. Nash equilibrium is the classical model of equilibrium for
each stage of the static game. In such an equilibrium the strategies of players may be randomized;
however, the randomizations of the players are independent. To measure the quality of outcomes in
games Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [9] introduced the price of anarchy, the ratio of the quality
of the worst Nash equilibrium over a socially optimal solution. Price of anarchy results have been
shown for large families of games, with a focus on those relevant for computer networks. Roughgar-
den [11] identified the canonical approach for bounding the price of anarchy of a game as showing
that it satisfies a natural smoothness condition.
There are two fundamental flaws with Nash equilibrium as a description of strategic behavior. First,
computing a Nash equilibrium can be PPAD hard and, thus, neither should efficient algorithms for
computing a Nash equilibrium be expected nor should any dynamics (of players with bounded com-
putational capabilities) converge to a Nash equilibrium. Second, natural behavior tends to introduce
correlations in strategies and therefore does not converge to Nash equilibrium even in the limit.
Both of these issues can be resolved for large families of games. First, there are relaxations of Nash
equilibrium which allow for correlation in the players’ strategies. Of these, this paper will focus
on coarse correlated equilibrium which requires the expected payoff of a player for the correlated
strategy be no worse than the expected payoff of any action at the player’s disposal. Second, it was
proven by Blum et al. [2] that the (asymptotic) no-regret property of many online learning algorithms
implies convergence to the set of coarse correlated equilibria.2
Blum et al. [2] extended the definition of the price of anarchy to outcomes obtained when each
player follows a no-regret learning algorithm.3 As coarse correlated equilibrium generalize Nash
equilibrium it could be that the worst case equilibrium under the former is worse than the latter.
Roughgarden [11], however, observed that there is often no degradation; specifically, the very same
smoothness property that he identified as implying good welfare in Nash equilibrium also proves
good welfare of coarse correlated equilibrium (equivalently: for outcomes from no-regret learners).
Thus, for a large family of static games, we can expect strategic behavior to lead to good outcomes.
This paper extends this theory to Bayesian games. Our contribution is two-fold: (i) We show an
analog of the convergence of no-regret learning to coarse correlated equilibria in Bayesian games,
which is of interest independently of our price of anarchy analysis; and (ii) we show that the coarse
correlated equilibria of the Bayesian version of any smooth static game have good welfare. Com-
bining these results, we conclude that no-regret learning in smooth Bayesian games achieves good
welfare.
These results are obtained as follows. It is possible to view a Bayesian game as a stochastic game,
i.e., where the payoff structure is fixed but there is a random action on the part of Nature. This
viewpoint applied to the above auction example considers a population of bidders associated for
each player and, in each stage, Nature uniformly at random selects one bidder from each population
to participate in the auction. We re-interpret and strengthen a result of Syrgkanis and Tardos [12]
by showing that the smoothness property of the static game (for any fixed profile of bidder values)
implies smoothness of this stochastic game. From the perspective of coarse correlated equilibrium,
there is no difference between a stochastic game and the non-stochastic game with each random
variable replaced with its expected value. Thus, the smoothness framework of Roughgarden [11]
extends this result to imply that the coarse correlated equilibria of the stochastic game are good.
To show that we can expect good outcomes in Bayesian games, it suffices to show that no-regret
learning converges to the coarse correlated equilibrium of this stochastic game. Importantly, when
we consider learning algorithms there is a distinction between the stochastic game where players’
payoffs are random variables and the non-stochastic game where players’ payoffs are the expectation
1In the standard terms of the game theory literature, we extend results for learning in games of complete
information to games of incomplete information.
2This result is a generalization of one of Foster and Vohra [7].
3They referred to this price of anarchy for no-regret learners as the price of total anarchy.
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of these variables. Our analysis addressed this distinction and, in particular, shows that, in the
stochastic game on populations, no-regret learning converges almost surely to the set of coarse
correlated equilibrium. This result implies that the average welfare of no-regret dynamics will be
good, almost surely, and not only in expectation over the random draws of Nature.
2 Preliminaries
This section describes a general game theoretic environment which includes auctions and resource
allocation mechanisms. For this general environment we review the results from the literature for
analyzing the social welfare that arises from no-regret learning dynamics in repeated game play.
The subsequent sections of the paper will generalize this model and these results to Bayesian games,
a.k.a., games of incomplete information.
General Game Form. A general game M is specified by a mapping from a profile a ∈ A ≡
A1 × · · · × An of allowable actions of players to an outcome. Behavior in a game may result in
(possibly correlated) randomized actions a ∈ ∆(A).4 Player i’s utility in this game is determined
by a profile of individual values v ∈ V ≡ V1 × · · · × Vn and the (implicit) outcome of the game; it
is denoted Ui(a; vi) = Ea∼a [Ui(a; vi)]. In games with a social planner or principal who does not
take an action in the game, the utility of the principal is R(a) = Ea∼a [R(a)]. In many games of
interest, such as auctions or allocation mechanisms, the utility of the principal is the revenue from
payments from the players. We will use the term mechanism and game interchangeably.
In a static game the payoffs of the players (given by v) are fixed. Subsequent sections will consider
Bayesian games in the independent private value model, i.e., where player i’s value vi is drawn
independently from the other players’ values and is known only privately to player i. Classical
game theory assumes complete information for static games, i.e., that v is known, and incomplete
information in Bayesian games, i.e., that the distribution over V is known. For our study of learning
in games no assumptions of knowledge are made; however, to connect to the classical literature
we will use its terminology of complete and incomplete information to refer to static and Bayesian
games, respectively.
Social Welfare. We will be interested in analyzing the quality of the outcome of the game as
defined by the social welfare, which is the sum of the utilities of the players and the principal. We
will denote by SW (a; v) =
∑
i∈[n] Ui(a; vi) +R(a) the expected social welfare of mechanismM
under a randomized action profile a. For any valuation profile v ∈ V we will denote the optimal
social welfare, i.e, the maximum over outcomes of the game of the sum of utilities, by OPT(v).
No-regret Learning and Coarse Correlated Equilibria. For complete information games, i.e.,
fixed valuation profile v, Blum et al. [2] analyzed repeated play of players using no-regret learning
algorithms, and showed that this play converges to a relaxation of Nash equilibrium, namely, coarse
correlated equilibrium.
Definition 1 (no regret). A player achieves no regret in a sequence of play a1, . . . , aT if his regret
against any fixed strategy a′i vanishes to zero:
limT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1(Ui(a
′
i, a
t
−i; vi)− Ui(a
t; vi)) = 0. (1)
Definition 2 (coarse correlated equilibrium, CCE). A randomized action profile a ∈ ∆(A) is a
coarse correlated equilibrium of a complete information game with valuation profile v if for every
player i and a′i ∈ Ai:
Ea [Ui(a; vi)] ≥ Ea [Ui(a
′
i, a−i; vi)] (2)
Theorem 3 (Blum et al. [2]). The empirical distribution of actions of any no-regret sequence in a
repeated game converges to the set of CCE of the static game.
Price of Anarchy of CCE. Roughgarden [11] gave a unifying framework for comparing the social
welfare, under various equilibrium notions including coarse correlated equilibrium, to the optimal
social welfare by defining the notion of a smooth game. This framework was extended to games like
auctions and allocation mechanisms by Syrgkanis and Tardos [12].
4Bold-face symbols denote random variables.
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Game/Mechanism (λ, µ) POA Reference
Simultaneous First Price Auction with Submodular Bidders (1− 1/e, 1) e
e−1 [12]
First Price Multi-Unit Auction (1− 1/e, 1) e
e−1 [5]
First Price Position Auction (1/2, 1) 2 [12]
All-Pay Auction (1/2, 1) 2 [12]
Greedy Combinatorial Auction with d-complements (1− 1/e, d) de
e−1 [10]
Proportional Bandwitdth Allocation Mechanism (1/4, 1) 4 [12]
Submodular Welfare Games (1, 1) 2 [13, 11]
Congestion Games with Linear Delays (5/3, 1/3) 5/2 [11]
Figure 1: Examples of smooth games and mechanisms
Definition 4 (smooth mechanism). A mechanismM is (λ, µ)-smooth for some λ, µ ≥ 0 there exists
an independent randomized action profile a∗(v) ∈ ∆(A1)×· · ·×∆(An) for each valuation profile
v, such that for any action profile a ∈ A and valuation profile v ∈ V:
∑
i∈[n] Ui(a
∗
i (v), a−i; vi) ≥ λ · OPT(v)− µ · R(a). (3)
Many important games and mechanisms satisfy this smoothness definition for various parameters
of λ and µ (see Figure 1); the following theorem shows that the welfare of any coarse correlated
equilibrium in any of these games is nearly optimal.
Theorem 5 (efficiency of CCE; [12]). If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth then the social welfare of
any course correlated equilibrium at least λmax{1,µ} of the optimal welfare, i.e., the price of anarchy
satisfies POA ≤ max{1,µ}
λ
.
Price of Anarchy of No-regret Learning. Following Blum et al. [2], Theorem 3 and Theorem 5
imply that no-regret learning dynamics have near-optimal social welfare.
Corollary 6 (efficiency of no-regret dyhamics; [12]). If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth then the
average welfare of any no-regret dynamics of the repeated game with a fixed player set and valuation
profile, achieves average social welfare at least λmax{1,µ} of the optimal welfare, i.e., the price of
anarchy satisfies POA ≤ max{1,µ}
λ
.
Importantly, Corollary 6 holds the valuation profile v ∈ V fixed throughout the repeated game play.
The main contribution of this paper is in extending this theory to games of incomplete information,
e.g., where the values of the players are drawn at random in each round of game play.
3 Population Interpretation of Bayesian Games
In the standard independent private value model of a Bayesian game there are n players. Player i
has type vi drawn uniformly from the set of type Vi (and this distribution is denoted Fi).5 We will
restrict attention to the case when the type space Vi is finite. A player’s strategy in this Bayesian
game is a mapping si : Vi → Ai from a valuation vi ∈ Vi to an action ai ∈ Ai. We will denote
with Σi = AVii the strategy space of each player and with Σ = Σ1 × . . .× Σn. In the game, each
player i realizes his type vi from the distribution and then makes action si(vi) in the game.
In the population interpretation of the Bayesian game, also called the agent normal form representa-
tion [6], there are n finite populations of players. Each player in population i has a type vi which we
assume to be distinct for each player in each population and across populations.6 The set of players
in the population is denoted Vi. and the player in population i with type vi is called player vi. In the
population game, each player vi chooses an action si(vi). Nature uniformly draws one player from
5The restriction to the uniform distribution is without loss of generality for any finite type space and for any
distribution over the type space that involves only rational probabilities.
6The restriction to distinct types is without of loss of generality as we can always augment a type space with
an index that does not affect player utilities.
4
each population, and the game is played with those players’ actions. In other words, the utility of
player vi from population i is:
UAGi,vi(s) = Ev [Ui(s(v);vi) · 1{vi = vi}] (4)
Notice that the population interpretation of the Bayesian game is in fact a stochastic game of com-
plete information.
There are multiple generalizations of coarse correlated equilibria from games of complete informa-
tion to games of incomplete information (c.f. [6], [1], [4]). One of the canonical definitions is simply
the coarse correlated equilibrium of the stochastic game of complete information that is defined by
the population interpretation above.7
Definition 7 (Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium - BAYES-CCE). A randomized strategy profile
s ∈ ∆(Σ) is a Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium if for every a′i ∈ Ai and for every vi ∈ Vi:
EsEv [Ui(s(v);vi) | vi = vi] ≥ EsEv [Ui(a
′
i, s−i(v−i);vi) | vi = vi] (5)
In a game of incomplete information the welfare in equilibrium will be compared to the expected
ex-post optimal social welfare Ev[OPT(v)]. We will refer to the worst-case ratio of the expected
optimal social welfare over the expected social welfare of any BAYES-CCE as BAYES-CCE-POA.
4 Learning in Repeated Bayesian Game
Consider a repeated version of the population interpretation of a Bayesian game. At each iteration
one player vi from each population is sampled uniformly and independently from other populations.
The set of chosen players then participate in an instance of a mechanism M. We assume that each
player vi ∈ Vi, uses some no-regret learning rule to play in this repeated game.8 In Definition 8, we
describe the structure of the game and our notation more elaborately.
Definition 8. The repeated Bayesian game of M proceeds as follows. In stage t:
1. Each player vi ∈ Vi in each population i picks an action sti(vi) ∈ Ai. We denote with
sti ∈ A
|Vi|
i the function that maps a player vi ∈ Vi to his action.
2. From each population i one player vti ∈ Vi is selected uniformly at random. Let vt =
(vt1, . . . , v
t
n) be the chosen profile of players and st(vt) = (st1(vt1), . . . , stn(vtn)) be the
profile of chosen actions.
3. Each player vti participates in an instance of game M, in the role of player i ∈ [n], with
action sti(vti) and experiences a utility of Ui(st(vt); vti). All players not selected in Step 2
experience zero utility.
Remark. We point out that for each player in a population to achieve no-regret he does not need
to know the distribution of values in other populations. There exist algorithms that can achieve the
no-regret property and simply require an oracle that returns the utility of a player at each iteration.
Thus all we need to assume is that each player receives as feedback his utility at each iteration.
Remark. We also note that our results would extend to the case where at each period multiple
matchings are sampled independently and players potentially participate in more than one instance
of the mechanismM and potentially with different players from the remaining population. The only
thing that the players need to observe in such a setting is their average utility that resulted from their
action sti(vi) ∈ Ai from all the instances that they participated at the given period. Such a scenario
seems an appealing model in online ad auction marketplaces where players receive only average
utility feedback from their bids.
7This notion is the coarse analog of the agent normal form Bayes correlated equilibrium defined in Section
4.2 of Forges [6].
8An equivalent and standard way to view a Bayesian game is that each player draws his value independently
from his distribution each time the game is played. In this interpretation the player plays by choosing a strategy
that maps his value to an action (or distribution over actions). In this interpretation our no-regret condition
requires that the player not regret his actions for each possible value.
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Bayesian Price of Anarchy for No-regret Learners. In this repeated game setting we want to
compare the average social welfare of any sequence of play where each player uses a vanishing
regret algorithm versus the average optimal welfare. Moreover, we want to quantify the worst-case
such average welfare over all possible valuation distributions within each population:
sup
F1,...,Fn
lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1
OPT(vt)
∑
T
t=1
SWM(st(vt);vt)
(6)
We will refer to this quantity as the Bayesian price of anarchy for no-regret learners. The numerator
of this term is simply the average optimal welfare when players from each population are drawn
independently in each stage; it converges almost surely to the expected ex-post optimal welfare
Ev[OPT(v)] of the stage game. Our main theorem is that if the mechanism is smooth and players
follow no-regret strategies then the expected welfare is guaranteed to be close to the optimal welfare.
Theorem 9 (Main Theorem). If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth then the average (over time) welfare
of any no-regret dynamics of the repeated Bayesian game achieves average social welfare at least
λ
max{1,µ} of the average optimal welfare, i.e. POA ≤ max{1,µ}λ , almost surely.
Roadmap of the proof. In Section 5, we show that any vanishing regret sequence of play of the
repeated Bayesian game, will converge almost surely to the Bayesian version of a coarse correlated
equilibrium of the incomplete information stage game. Therefore the Bayesian price of total anarchy
will be upper bounded by the efficiency of guarantee of any Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium.
Finally, in Section 6 we show that the price of anarchy bound of smooth mechanisms directly extends
to Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria, thereby providing an upper bound on the Bayesian price of
total anarchy of the repeated game.
Remark. We point out that our definition of BAYES-CCE is inherently different and more restricted
than the one defined in Caragiannis et al. [4]. There, a BAYES-CCE is defined as a joint distribution
D over V ×A, such that if (v, a) ∼ D then for any vi ∈ Vi and a′i(vi) ∈ Ai:
E(v,a) [Ui(a; vi)] ≥ E(v,a) [Ui(a
′
i(vi), a−i; vi)] (7)
The main difference is that the product distribution defined by a distribution in ∆(Σ) and the dis-
tribution of values, cannot produce any possible joint distribution over (V ,A), but the type of joint
distributions are restricted to satisfy a conditional independence property described by [6]. Namely
that player i’s action is conditionally independent of some other player j’s value, given player i’s
type. Such a conditional independence property is essential for the guarantees that we will present
in this work to extend to a BAYES-CCE and hence do not seem to extend to the notion given in [4].
However, as we will show in Section 5, the no-regret dynamics that we analyze, which are math-
ematically equivalent to the dynamics in [4], do converge to this smaller set of BAYES-CCE that
we define and for which our efficiency guarantees will extend. This extra convergence property is
not needed when the mechanism satisfies the stronger semi-smoothness property defined in [4] and
thereby was not needed to show efficiency bounds in their setting.
5 Convergence of Bayesian No-Regret to BAYES-CCE
In this section we show that no-regret learning in the repeated Bayesian game converges almost
surely to the set of Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria. Any given sequence of play of the repeated
Bayesian game, which we defined in Definition 8, gives rise to a sequence of strategy-value pairs
(st, vt) where st = (st1, . . . , stn) and sti ∈ A
Vi
i , captures the actions that each player vi in population
iwould have chosen, had they been picked. Then observe that all that matters to compute the average
social welfare of the game for any given time step T , is the empirical distribution of pairs (s, v), up
till time step T , denoted as DT , i.e. if (sT ,vT ) is a random sample from DT :
1
T
∑T
t=1 SW (s
t(vt); vt) = E(sT ,vT )
[
SW (sT (vT );vT )
] (8)
Lemma 10 (Almost sure convergence to BAYES-CCE). Consider a sequence of play of the random
matching game, where each player uses a vanishing regret algorithm and let DT be the empirical
distribution of (strategy, valuation) profile pairs up till time step T . Consider any subsequence of
{DT }T that converges in distribution to some distribution D. Then, almost surely, D is a product
distribution, i.e. D = Ds × Dv, with Ds ∈ ∆(Σ) and Dv × ∆(V) such that Dv = F and
Ds ∈ BAYES-CCE of the static incomplete information game with distributional beliefs F .
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Proof. We will denote with
ri(a
∗
i , a; vi) = Ui(a
∗
i , a−i; vi)− Ui(a; vi),
the regret of player vi from population i, for action a∗i at action profile a. For a vi ∈ Vi let xti(vi) =
1{vti = vi}. Since the sequence has vanishing regret for each player vi in population Pi, it must be
that for any s∗i ∈ Σi: ∑T
t=1 x
t
i(vi) · ri (s
∗
i (vi), s
t(vt); vi) ≤ o(T ) (9)
For any fixed T , let DTs ∈ ∆(Σ) denote the empirical distribution of st and let s be a random sample
from DTs . For each s ∈ Σ, let Ts ⊂ [T ] denote the time steps such that st = s for each t ∈ Ts. Then
we can re-write Equation (9) as:
Es
[
1
|Ts|
∑
t∈Ts
xti(vi) · ri (s
∗
i (vi), s
t(vt); vi)
]
≤ o(T )
T
(10)
For any s ∈ Σ and w ∈ V , let Ts,w = {t ∈ Ts : vt = w}. Then we can re-write Equation (10) as:
Es
[∑
w∈V
|Ts,w|
|Ts|
1{wi = vi} · ri (s
∗
i (vi), s(w); vi)
]
≤ o(T )
T
(11)
Now we observe that |Ts,w||Ts| is the empirical frequency of the valuation vector w ∈ V , when filtered
at time steps where the strategy vector was s. Since at each time step t the valuation vector vt is
picked independently from the distribution of valuation profiles F , this is the empirical frequency
of Ts independent samples from F .
By standard arguments from empirical processes theory, if Ts →∞ then this empirical distribution
converges almost surely to the distribution F . On the other hand if Ts doesn’t go to ∞, then the
empirical frequency of strategy s vanishes to 0 as T → ∞ and therefore has measure zero in the
above expectation as T → ∞. Thus for any convergent subsequence of {DT }, if D is the limit
distribution, then if s is in the support of D, then almost surely the distribution of w conditional on
strategy s is F . Thus we can write D as a product distribution Ds ×F .
Moreover, if we denote with w the random variable that follows distribution F , then the limit of
Equation (11) for any convergent sub-sequence, will give that:
a.s.: Es∼DsEw∼F [1{wi = vi} · ri (s
∗
i (vi), s(w); vi)] ≤ 0
Equivalently, we get that Ds will satisfy that for all vi ∈ Vi and for all s∗i :
a.s.: Es∼DsEw∼F [ri (s
∗
i (wi), s(w);wi) | wi = vi] ≤ 0
The latter is exactly the BAYES-CCE condition from Definition 7. Thus Ds is in the set of
BAYES-CCE of the static incomplete incomplete information game among n players, where the
type profile is drawn from F .
Given the latter convergence theorem we can easily conclude the following the following theorem,
whose proof is given in the supplementary material.
Theorem 11. The price of anarchy for Bayesian no-regret dynamics is upper bounded by the price
of anarchy of Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria, almost surely.
6 Efficiency of Smooth Mechanisms at Bayes Coarse Correlated Equilibria
In this section we show that smoothness of a mechanism M implies that any BAYES-CCE of the
incomplete information setting achieves at least λmax{1,µ} of the expected optimal welfare. To show
this we will adopt the interpretation of BAYES-CCE that we used in the previous section, as coarse
correlated equilibria of a more complex normal form game; the stochastic agent normal form rep-
resentation of the Bayesian game. We can interpret this complex normal form game as the game
that arises from a complete information mechanism MAG among
∑
i |Vi| players, which randomly
samples one player from each of the n population and where the utility of a player in the complete
information mechanism MAG is given by Equation (4). The set of possible outcomes in this agent
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game corresponds to the set of mappings from a profile of chosen players to an outcome in the un-
derlying mechanism M. The optimal welfare of this game, is then the expected ex-post optimal
welfare OPTAG = Ev [OPT(v)].
The main theorem that we will show is that whenever mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth, then also
mechanism MAG is (λ, µ)-smooth. Then we will invoke a theorem of [12, 11], which shows that
any coarse correlated equilibrium of a complete information mechanism achieves at least λmax{1,µ}
of the optimal welfare. By the equivalence between BAYES-CCE and CCE of this complete infor-
mation game, we get that every BAYES-CCE of the Bayesian game achieves at least λmax{1,µ} of the
expected optimal welfare.
Theorem 12 (From complete information to Bayesian smoothness). If a mechanism M is (λ, µ)-
smooth, then for any vector of independent valuation distributions F = (F1, . . . ,Fn), the complete
information mechanismMAG is also (λ, µ)-smooth.
Proof. Consider the following randomized deviation for each player vi ∈ Vi in population i: He
random samples a valuation profile w ∼ F . Then he plays according to the randomized action
s
∗
i (vi,w−i), i.e., the player deviates using the randomized action guaranteed by the smoothness
property of mechanismM for his type vi and the random sample of the types of the others w−i.
Consider an arbitrary action profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) for all players in all populations. In this
context it is better to think of each si as a |Vi| dimensional vector inA|Vi|i and to view s as a
∑
i |Vi|
dimensional vector. Then with s−vi we will denote all the components of this large vector except
the ones corresponding to player vi ∈ Vi. Moreover, we will be denoting with v a sample from F
drawn by mechanismMAG. We now argue about the expected utility of player vi from this deviation,
which is:
Ew
[
UAGi,vi(s
∗
i (vi,w−i), s−vi)
]
= EwEv [Ui(s
∗
i (vi,w−i), s−i(v−i); vi) · 1{vi = vi}]
Summing the latter over all players vi ∈ Vi in population i:∑
vi∈Vi
Ew
[
UAGi,vi(s
∗
i (vi,w−i), s−vi)
]
= Ew,v
[∑
vi∈Vi
Ui(s
∗
i (vi,w−i), s−i(v−i); vi) · 1{vi = vi}
]
= Ev,w [Ui(s
∗
i (vi,w−i), s−i(v−i);vi)]
= Ev,w [Ui(s
∗
i (wi,w−i), s−i(v−i);wi)]
= Ev,w [Ui(s
∗
i (w), s−i(v−i);wi)] ,
where the second to last equation is an exchange of variable names and regrouping using indepen-
dence. Summing over populations and using smoothness of M, we get smoothness of MAG:
∑
i∈[n]
∑
vi∈Vi
Ew
[
UAGi,vi(s
∗
i (vi,w−i), s−vi)
]
= Ev,w
[∑
i∈[n] Ui(s
∗
i (w), s−i(v−i);wi)
]
≥ Ev,w [λOPT(w)− µR(s(v))] = λEw [OPT(w)]− µRAG(s)
Corollary 13. Every BAYES-CCE of the incomplete information setting of a smooth mechanism
M, achieves expected welfare at least λmax{1,µ} of the expected optimal welfare.
7 Finite Time Analysis and Convergence Rates
In the previous section we argued about the limit average efficiency of the game as time goes to
infinity. In this section we analyze the convergence rate to BAYES-CCE and we show approximate
efficiency results even for finite time, when players are allowed to have some ǫ-regret.
Theorem 14. Consider the repeated matching game with a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism. Suppose that
for any T ≥ T 0, each player in each of the n populations has regret at most ǫ
n
. Then for every δ
and ρ, there exists a T ∗(δ, ρ), such that for any T ≥ min{T 0, T ∗}, with probability 1− ρ:
1
T
∑T
t=1 SW (s
t(vt); vt) ≥ λmax{1,µ}Ev [OPT(v)] − δ − µ · ǫ (12)
Moreover, T ∗(δ, ρ) ≤ 54·n
3·|Σ|·|V|2·H3
δ3
log
(
2
ρ
)
.
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Supplementary material for
“No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games”
A Proof of Theorem 11
For readability we repeat the definitions of Lemma 10 and Theorem 11 from the main text.
Lemma 10 Let D ∈ ∆(Σ × V) be a joint distribution of (strategy, valuation) profile pairs. Con-
sider a sequence of play of the random matching game, where each player uses a vanishing regret
algorithm and let DT be the empirical distribution of strategy, valuation profile pairs up till time
step T . Suppose that there exists a subsequence of {DT }T that converges in distribution to D. Then,
almost surely, D is a product distribution, i.e. D = Ds×Dv, with Ds ∈ ∆(Σ) and Dv×∆(V) such
that Dv = F and Ds ∈ BAYES-CCE of the static incomplete information game with distributional
beliefs F .
Theorem 11 The price of anarchy for Bayesian no-regret dynamics is upper bounded by the price
of anarchy of Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria.
Proof. Let D ∈ ∆(Σ × V) be a joint distribution, such that there is a subsequence of {DT}T ,
converging in distribution to D. Then by Lemma 10, almost surely, D is a product distribution, i.e.
D ∈ ∆(Σ)×∆(V) and that the marginal on V is equal toF and the marginal on Σ is a BAYES-CCE
of the static incomplete information game with distributional beliefs F .
Therefore, if ρ is the BAYES-CCE − POA of the mechanism, and if (s,v) is a random sample from
D, then almost surely:
Es,v [SW (s(v);v)] ≥
1
ρ
Ev [OPT(v)] (13)
Thus the limit average social welfare of any convergent subsequence will be at least 1
ρ
Ev [OPT(v)],
which then implies that almost surely:
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
SW (st(vt); vt) ≥
1
ρ
Ev [OPT(v)] =
1
ρ
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
OPT(vt)
Thus for any non-measure zero event, for any ǫ, there exists a f(ǫ) such that for any T ≥ f(ǫ):
1
T
T∑
t=1
SW (st(vt); vt) ≥
1
ρ
1
T
T∑
t=1
OPT(vt)− ǫ
With no loss of generality we can assume that Ev [OPT(v)] > 0 (o.w. valuations are all zero
and theorem holds trivially). Since, the average optimal welfare converges almost surely to
Ev [OPT(v)], we get that for any non-measure zero event, there exists a g(δ) such that for T ≥ g(δ),
1
T
∑T
t=1 OPT(vt) is bounded away from zero. Thereby, we can turn the additive error into a multi-
plicative one, i.e. for any non-measure zero event and for any ǫ′ there exists w(ǫ′) such that for any
T ≥ w(ǫ′):
1
T
T∑
t=1
SW (st(vt); vt) ≥
1
ρ
(1 + ǫ′)
1
T
T∑
t=1
OPT(vt)
This implies that almost surely:
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 OPT(vt)
1
T
∑T
t=1 SW (s
t(vt); vt)
≤ ρ = BAYES-CCE-POA
1
B Proof of Theorem 14
Theorem 14 Consider the repeated matching game with a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism. Suppose that
for any T ≥ T 0, each player in each of the n populations has regret at most ǫ
n
. Then for every δ
and ρ, there exists a T ∗(δ, ρ), such that for any T ≥ min{T 0, T ∗}, with probability 1− ρ:
1
T
T∑
t=1
SW (st(vt); vt) ≥
λ
max{1, µ}
Ev [OPT(v)] − δ − µ · ǫ (14)
Moreover, T ∗(δ, ρ) ≤ 54·n
3·|Σ|·|V|2·H3
δ3
log
(
2
ρ
)
.
Proof. Fix a population i and a Bayesian strategy s∗i ∈ Σi, as well as a Bayesian strategy profile
s ∈ Σ. For shorter notation we will denote:
πi(s
∗
i , s, v) = Ui(s
∗
i (vi), s−i(v−i); vi).
For a time step T , let pT (s) = |Ts|
T
be the empirical distribution of a Bayesian strategy s and with
pT (v|s) =
|Ts,v|
|Ts|
be the empirical distribution of values conditional on a Bayesian strategy s. The
average utility of a population i up till time step T , when switching to a fixed Bayesian strategy s∗i ,
can be written as:
1
T
T∑
t=1
π(s∗i , s
t, vt) =
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s) · πi(s
∗
i , s, v) (15)
We will show that for any s∗i , there exists a T ∗(δ, ρ) such that for any T ≥ T ∗(δ, ρ), with probability
1− ρ: ∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s) · πi(s
∗
i , s, v) ≥
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)Ev [πi(s
∗
i , s,v)]− δ (16)
where v is a random variable drawn from the distribution of valuation profiles F . We will denote
with p(v) the density function implied by distribution F .
In what follows we will denote with H = maxi∈[n],vi∈Vi,xi∈Xi vi(xi) the maximum possible value
of any player. Thus observe that the utility of any player is upper bounded by H and that the revenue
collected by any player at equilibrium is upper bounded by H .
For a time period T , let G = {s ∈ Σ : pT (s) ≥ ζ}. Then observe that:
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
(
pT (v|s)− p(v)
)
· πi(s
∗
i , s, v) ≥
∑
s∈G
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
(
pT (v|s)− p(v)
)
· πi(s
∗
i , s, v)− ζ · |Σ| ·H
Observe that for any s ∈ G, |Ts| ≥ ζ · T . Thus pT (v|s) is the empirical mean of at least ζ · T
independent random samples of a Bernoulli trial with success probability p(v). Hence, by Hoeffding
bounds, we have that |pT (v|s)− p(v)| ≤ t with probability at least 1− 2 exp
(
−2 · ζ · T · t2
)
. Thus
with that much probability we get:
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
(
pT (v|s)− p(v)
)
· πi(s
∗
i , s, v) ≥ −t · |V| ·H − ζ · |Σ| ·H
By setting t = δ2·|V|·H , ζ =
δ
2·|Σ|·H and T
∗(δ, ρ) = 16·|Σ|·|V|
2·H3
δ3
log
(
2
ρ
)
, we get the claimed
property in Equation (16).
Now suppose that after time step T 0 each player in a population has regret ǫ/n. Thus the average
utility of the population is at least the utility from switching to any fixed Bayesian strategy s∗i , minus
an error term of ǫ/n:
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s)πi(si, s, v) ≥
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s)πi(s
∗
i , s, v)−
ǫ
n
(17)
2
From the previous analysis, for any T ≥ min{T 0, T ∗( 2δ3·n , ρ)}, we get that with probability 1− ρ:
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s)πi(si, s, v) ≥
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)Ev [πi(s
∗
i , s,v)]−
2δ
3n
−
ǫ
n
(18)
Summing over all populations and using the Bayesian smoothness property of the mechanism from
Theorem 12, we have that with probability 1− ρ:
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s)
∑
i
πi(si, s, v) ≥
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
(
λEv [OPT(v)] − µRAG(s)
)
−
2δ
3
− ǫ
≥ λEv [OPT(v)] − µ
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)RAG(s)−
2δ
3
− ǫ
To conclude the theorem we observe that since for any s ∈ Σ, |pT (v|s)− p(v)| ≤ δ3·n·|V|·H , we get
that:
RAG(s) =
∑
v∈V
p(v)R(s(v)) ≤
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s)R(s(v)) +
δ
3
(19)
Since, the revenue collected by a player at any action in the support of an equilibrium is at most H .
By the latter we can combine the revenue on the right hand side with the utility on the left hand side.
We can also bound the remaining (µ − 1) of the revenue, by (µ − 1) of the average welfare minus
ǫ, since each player in each population can always drop out of the auction and therefore his average
utility at an ǫ
n
-regret sequence must be at least − ǫ
n
.
Hence, we get that:
∑
s∈Σ
pT (s)
∑
v∈V
pT (v|s)SW (s(v); v) ≥
λ
max{1, µ}
Ev [OPT(v)] − δ − µ · ǫ (20)
Thus choosing T ∗(ρ, 2δ3·n) =
54·n3·|Σ|·|V|2·H3
δ3
log
(
2
ρ
)
, we get the conditions of the theorem.
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